We embed a multi-country, multi-sector Ricardian model of trade into a neoclassical growth framework. We argue that international trade in capital goods is crucial to understand economic development through two channels: (i) capital formation and (ii) aggregate TFP. In our sample of 84 countries in 2005, over 80 percent of capital goods production in the world is concentrated in 9 countries; poor countries import most of their capital goods. Barriers to trade result in a misallocation of factors both within and across countries. We calibrate the model to bilateral trade flows. Our model accounts for 73 percent of the observed log variance in income per worker and matches the world distribution of capital goods production across countries. When the world moves to free trade in capital goods, the income per worker increases in every country, but countries in the bottom decile of the income distribution gain nearly thrice as much as the countries in the top decile. Shutting down trade in capital goods forces countries to allocate productive resources away from the sector of their comparative advantage, thereby reducing capital formation as well as TFP. The income loss from such a shut down is 9 percent for countries in the bottom decile of the income distribution.
Introduction
Cross-country differences in income per worker are large: the ratio of income for countries in the top decile of the income distribution relative to countries in the bottom decile is roughly 42 (Penn World Tables version 6. 3, see Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009 ). Development accounting exercises such as Caselli (2005) , Hall and Jones (1999) , and Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) show that approximately 50 percent of the differences in income per worker are accounted for by factors of production, i.e., capital and labor, and the rest is attributed to aggregate total factor productivity (TFP).
In this paper, we argue that international trade in capital goods is important for crosscountry income differences through two channels: capital formation and aggregate TFP. Two facts motivate our argument: (i) capital goods production is concentrated in a few countries and (ii) the dependence on capital goods imports is systematically related to a country's level of income. The first fact is illustrated in Figure 1 . Nine countries account for about 80 percent of world capital goods production (see Eaton and Kortum (2001) ); capital goods production is more concentrated than GDP. The second fact is that the imports to production ratio for capital goods is negatively correlated with economic development: the correlation between the ratio and income per worker is -0.34. Malawi imports 39 times as much capital goods as it produces, Argentina imports 19 times as much as it produces, while the U.S. imports only half as much as it produces. Both facts suggest that closed economy models of capital formation can at best be only part of the explanation for cross-country factor differences.
Aggregate TFP differences across countries are also one of the consequences of international trade. Barriers to trade result in countries producing goods for which they do not have a comparative advantage. Poor countries, for instance, do not have a comparative advantage in producing capital goods. Trade barriers imply that poor countries produce too much capital goods, relative to non-capital goods. This results in a misallocation of resources and affects aggregate TFP. 1 A reduction in barriers would then imply that each country specializes more in the direction of its comparative advantage resulting in a reduction in cross-country TFP differences.
We develop a multi-country Ricardian trade model along the lines of ?, Eaton and Kortum (2002) , Alvarez and Lucas (2007) , and Waugh (2010) . Each country is endowed with labor that is not mobile internationally. Each country has technologies for producing a final We calibrate the model to be consistent with the observed pattern of bilateral trade in capital goods and in intermediate goods. Our model fits the trade data well: the R 2 is 79 percent for the capital goods sector and 69 percent for the intermediate goods sector.
The productivity gap between rich and poor countries is larger in capital goods than in intermediate goods. The 90-10 ratio of average productivity is 4.14 in the capital goods sector and 3.27 in the intermediate goods sector. Thus, the pattern of comparative advantage is such that poor countries are net importers of capital goods and net exporters of intermediate goods. Our model reproduces the fact that a few countries produce most of the capital goods. Our model also accounts for almost the entire log variance in capital goods production.
On economic development, our model explains 73 percent of the log variance in income per worker. If we conduct a development accounting exercise in our model in the spirit of Caselli (2005) , at least 70 percent of the log variance in income per worker is due to factors of production.
To understand the quantitative implications of international trade in capital goods for economic development, we perform four counterfactual exercises. The first pair of exercises computes the welfare gains from moving to free trade in capital goods and the welfare cost of shutting down international trade in capital goods. The barriers in the intermediates goods sector are maintained at calibrated levels. In both exercises, the changes in welfare stem from changes in the pattern of trade and changes in capital formation. When the world moves to free trade in capital goods, we find that while the income per worker increases in every country, countries in the bottom decile of the income distribution gain more than twice as much as the countries in the top decile. On average, 95 percent of the increase in income per worker is accounted for by increases in capital stock. Shutting down trade in capital goods results in a welfare cost of 9 percent for countries in the bottom decile of the income distribution. For almost all of the countries, the welfare cost is entirely due to smaller capital stock.
The second pair of counterfactuals examines the effects of opening up or shutting down both capital goods and intermediates goods sectors. Moving to free trade in both sectors results in substantial welfare gains: the gain for the bottom decile is almost three times the gain for the top decile. On average, 80 percent of the gains are accounted for by capital formation. A move to autarky implies a welfare cost of 26 percent for the bottom decile.
Lower capital stock accounts for 87 percent of the welfare costs, on average. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the multi-country Ricardian trade model and presents the equilibrium in this model. Section 3 describes the calibration methodology. The results from the quantitative model are presented in section 4 and section 5 discusses the counterfactual experiments. Section 6 concludes.
Model
Our model extends the framework of Eaton and Kortum (2002) , Alvarez and Lucas (2007) , and Waugh (2010) to two tradable sectors and embeds it into a neoclassical growth framework. There are I countries indexed by i = 1, . . . , I. Time is discrete and runs from t = 0, 1, . . . , ∞. There are two tradable sectors, capital goods and intermediates, and two nontradable sectors, structures and final goods. (We will use "producer durables" and "cap- Each country i has a representative household endowed with a measure N it of workers at time t. The measure grows over time at the rate n. Each worker has a human capital level of h it that grows over time at the rate g. Effective labor is denoted by L it = N it h it , which is immobile across countries but perfectly mobile across sectors within a country. The representative household owns its country's stock of producer durables and stock of structures. The respective capital stocks are denoted by K e it and K s it . They are rented to domestic firms. Earnings from capital and labor are spent on consumption and investment in producer durables and in structures. The two investments augment the respective capital stocks. From now on, all quantities are reported in efficiency units (e.g., k e = K e /L is the stock of producer durables per effective worker); and, where it is understood, country and time subscripts are omitted. Eaton and Kortum (2002) , the indices u and v represent idiosyncratic draws for each good along the continuum. These draws are viewed as random variables drawn from country-and sector-specific distributions, with densities denoted by φ bi for b ∈ {e, m}, and i = 1, . . . , I. We denote the joint density, across countries for each sector by φ b .
Technology
Composite goods All individual capital goods types along the continuum are aggregated into a composite producer durable E according to 
Individual goods All individual goods are produced using the stocks of capital, labor, and the composite intermediate good.
The technologies for producing individual goods in each sector are given by
For each factor used in production, the subscript denotes the sector that uses the factor, the argument in the parentheses denotes the index of the good along the continuum, and the superscript on the two capital stocks denotes either producer durables or structures. For example, k s e (v) is the amount of structures capital used to produce capital good type v. The parameter ν ∈ (0, 1) determines the share of value added in production, while α ∈ (0, 1) determines capital's share in value added. The parameter µ controls the share of producer durables relative to structures.
The random variables u and v are distributed exponentially. In country i, v has an exponential distribution with parameter λ ei > 0, while u has an exponential distribution with parameter λ mi > 0. Then, factor productivities, v −θ and u −θ , have Fréchet distributions, implying average factor productivities of λ θ e and λ θ m . If λ ei > λ ej , then on average, country i is more efficient than country j at producing capital goods. Average productivity at the sectoral level determines specialization across sectors. Countries for which λ e /λ m is high will tend to be net exporters of capital goods and net importers of intermediate goods. The parameter θ > 0 governs the coefficient of variation of the distribution of productivity draws. A larger θ implies more variation in productivity draws across individual goods within each sector, and hence, more room for specialization within each sector. We assume that the parameter θ is the same across the two sectors and in all countries.
Nontradable goods
Recall that final goods and structures are nontradable. The final good is consumed by the household and output produced by the structures sector augments the stock of structures. The final good is produced using capital, labor, and intermediate goods according to
Investment in structures is produced similarly:
Capital accumulation
The stocks of producer durables and structures are accumulated according to
where δ e and δ s are the depreciation rates of producer durables and structures respectively.
The terms x e it and x s it denote investments in the two types of capital stocks in country i in period t.
Preferences The representative household in country i derives utility from consumption of the final good according to
where c it is consumption of the final (non-tradable) good in country i at time t, and β is the period discount factor, which satisfies 1 β > 1 + n. that country j must export in order for one unit to arrive in country i. As a normalization we assume that there are no barriers to ship goods domestically; that is, τ bii = 1 for all i and b ∈ {e, m}. We also assume that the triangle inequality holds: τ bij τ bjl ≥ τ bil .
International Trade
We focus on a steady-state competitive equilibrium. Informally, a steady-state equilibrium is a set of prices and allocations that satisfy the following conditions: 1) The representative household maximizes lifetime utility, taking prices as given; 2) firms maximize profits, taking factor prices as given; 3) domestic markets for factors and nontradable goods clear; 4) total trade is balanced in each country; and 5) quantities in efficiency units are constant over time. Note that condition 4 allows for the possibility of trade imbalances at the sectoral level, but a trade surplus in one sector must be offset by an equal deficit in the other sector.
In the remainder of this section we describe each condition from country i's point of view.
Household optimization
At the beginning of each time period, the stocks of producer durables and structures are predetermined and are rented to domestic firms in all sectors at the competitive rental rates r eit and r sit . Each period the household splits its income between consumption, c it , which has price P f it , and investments in producer durables and in structures, x e it and x s it , which have prices P eit and P sit respectively.
The household is faced with a standard consumption-savings problem, the solution to which is characterized by two Euler equations, the budget constraint, and two capital accumulation equations. In steady state these conditions are as follows:
Firm optimization
Denote the price of intermediate good u that was produced in country j and purchased by country i by p mij (u). Then, p mij (u) = p mjj (u)τ mij , where p mjj (u) is the marginal cost of producing good u in country j. Since each country purchases each individual good from the least cost supplier, the actual price in country i for the intermediate good The prices of the composite producer durable and the composite intermediate good are
We explain how we derive the price indices for each country in appendix A. Given the assumption on the country-specific densities, φ ei and φ mi , our model implies
where the unit costs for input bundles d bi , for each sector b ∈ {e, m}, are given by
, m, f, s} are constant across countries and are given by
is the gamma function. We restrict parameters such that A > 0.
The prices of the final good and structures are simply their marginal costs:
For each tradable sector the fraction of country i's expenditure on imports from country j is given by
An alternative interpretation of π bij is that it is the fraction of sector b goods that j supplies to i. We describe how to derive trade shares in appendix A.
Equilibrium
We first define total factor usage in the intermediate goods sector in country i as follows:
where ℓ mi (u), k e mi (u), k s mi (u), and M mi (u) refer to the amount of labor, stock of producer durables, stock of structures, and composite intermediate good used in country i to produce the intermediate good u. Note that each of l mi (u), k e mi (u), k s mi (u), and M mi (u) will take the value zero if country i imports good u. Total factor usage for the capital goods sector (ℓ ei , k e ei , k s ei , M ei ) are defined analogously.
The factor market clearing conditions in country i are
The left-hand side of each of the previous equations is simply the factor usage by each sector, while the right-hand side is the factor availability.
The next three conditions require that the quantity of consumption and investment goods purchased by the household must equal the amounts available in country i:
Aggregating over all producers of individual goods in each sector of country i and using the fact that each producer minimizes costs, the factor demands at the sectoral level are described by
where Y bi is the value of output in sector b. Imposing the goods market clearing condition for each sector implies that
The total expenditure by country j on capital goods is L j P ej E j , and π eji is the fraction spent by country j on capital goods imported from country i. Thus, the product, L j P ej E j π eji , is the total value of capital goods trade flows from country i to country j.
To close the model we impose balanced trade country by country.
The left-hand side denotes country i's imports of capital goods and intermediate goods, while the right-hand side denotes country i's exports. This condition allows for trade imbalances at the sectoral level within each country; however, a surplus in capital goods must be offset by an equal deficit in intermediates and vice versa.
This completes the description of the steady-state equilibrium in our model. We next turn to calibration of the model.
Calibration
We calibrate our model using data for a set of 84 countries for the year 2005. This set includes both developed and developing countries and accounts for about 80 percent of the world GDP as computed from version 6.3 of the Penn World Tables (see Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009 
Common parameters
We begin by describing the parameter values that are common to all countries; see Table 1 . We set the growth rate in the labor force n to 0.016. This is computed by using the average geometric growth rate in world population from 2000 through 2007. We set the growth rate of efficiency g equal to 0.02, the average growth rate for the US over the past 100 years.
The discount factor β is set to 0.96, in line with common values in the literature. Following Alvarez and Lucas (2007) , we set η equal to 2. None of these parameters -n, g, β, or η -are quantitatively important for the question addressed in this paper. 2 From now on, the capital stock k denotes the Cobb-Douglas composite of the stocks of producer durables and structures: k = (k e ) µ (k s ) 1−µ . The share of capital in GDP, α, is set at 1/3, as in Gollin (2002) . Using capital stock data from the BEA, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) measure the rates of depreciation for both producer durables and structures. We set our values in accordance with their estimates: δ e = 0.12 and δ s = 0.06. We also set the share of producer durables in composite capital, µ, at 0.56 in accordance with Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) .
The parameters ν m , ν e , ν s , and ν f , respectively, control the shares of value added in intermediate goods, capital goods, structures, and final goods production. To calibrate ν m and ν e , we employ the data on value added and total output available in INDSTAT 4 2010 database. To compute ν s we compute value added shares in gross output for construction for a set of 32 OECD countries, and average across these countries. Data on value added output and gross output for OECD are taken from input-output tables from the STAN database maintained by OECD for the period "mid 2000s", http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx. We set the value ν s at 0.39. To calibrate ν f we employ the same input-output tables. The share of intermediates in final goods is 1 − ν f . Our estimate of ν f is 0.9. (Alvarez and Lucas (2007) compute a share of 0.82 by excluding agriculture and mining from the final goods sector. Since we include agriculture and mining, we obtain a larger estimate.)
The parameter θ controls the dispersion in efficiency levels. We use a simulated method of moments methodology as in Simonovska and Waugh (2011) and estimate this to be 0.23.
Country specific parameters
We take the labor force N from Penn World Tables version 6.3 (PWT63, see Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2009) . To construct measures of human capital h, we follow Caselli (2005) by converting data on years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2010) into measures of human capital using Mincer returns. Effective labor is then L = N h; see appendix B for details.
The remaining parameters include the productivity parameters λ ei and λ mi as well as the bilateral trade barriers τ eij and τ mij . We calibrate these to match the pattern of bilateral trade in both capital goods and intermediate goods as described below. 
Estimating trade costs
The fraction of sector b goods that country i purchases from country j is
From this we can infer that
We specify a parsimonious functional form for trade costs as follows:
where ex j is an exporter fixed effect dummy. The variable dist ij,k is a dummy taking a value of one if two countries i and j are in the k'th distance interval. Given the specification for trade costs, logs of both sides of (1) imply a specification ready 
To compute the empirical counterpart to π bij , we follow Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) , see appendix B. We take θ as given and recover the fixed effects F bi as country-specific fixed effects using Ordinary Least Squares, sector by sector. (Observations for which there is zero observed trade flows are omitted from the regression.)
The regression for the capital goods sector produces an R 2 of 79 percent with 5924 usable observations, while the regression for the intermediate goods sector produces an R 2 of 69 percent with 6498 usable observations.
As can be seen in Figures 2 and 3 , trade barriers are larger in the intermediate goods sector. These figures display the average trade-weighted barrier to export, computed as
where X ji denotes the total trade flow from country i to country j. Clearly poor countries face a larger barriers to export both capital and intermediate goods. Trade−weighted export barrier: producer durables
Calibrating productivity
With the estimated trade costs τ bij and the fixed effects F bi in hand, we use the model's equilibrium structure to recover λ bi for b ∈ {e, m}. With two sectors in each country and I countries, we have a total of 2I fixed effect coefficients (F bi ) and need to recover 2I productivity parameters (λ bi ). We feed the estimated trade costs into the model and search for the λ bi 's such that the associated equilibrium unit costs d bi satisfy F bi = log
. The productivity parameters, relative to the US, are given in Table 2 . The 90-10 ratio of the average productivity is 4.14 for capital goods and 3.27 for the intermediate goods.
For most countries, the fraction of capital goods spending that is spent on domestically produced goods is less than 20 percent. Moreover, home trade shares do not vary systematically with level of development. This is important as the calibration targets are relative trade shares π ij /π ii and not the absolute level of π ii . For this reason it is necessary to allow for asymmetry in trade barriers, i.e., τ ij ̸ = τ ji . A more subtle point, however, is that it would not be prudent to assume that trade barriers are just country specific, i.e., τ ij = τ i for all j ̸ = i (importer specific) or τ ij = τ i for all i ̸ = j (exporter specific). To understand why, consider the first case of importer-specific trade costs: τ ij = τ i for all j ̸ = i. Then consider the following 4 countries. Argentina, Indonesia, Japan, and the US. If trade barriers are specific to the importer, then the ratio of Japan's share in Argentina to US's share in Argentina, π e,ARG,GER /π e,ARG,U SA , would equal the ratio of Japan's share in Indonesia to the US's share in Indonesia, π e,IDN,JP N /π e,IDN,U SA . However, this is not the case. For example, in the data, π e,ARG,JP N /π e,ARG,U SA = 0.03/0.18 = 0.17, while π e,IDN,JP N /π e,IDN,U SA = 0.16/0.05 = 3.2. A similar contradiction arises by assuming that trade barriers are specific to the exporter.
Results

Economic Development
We define income per-effective worker, at PPP, to be total factor income divided by the price of the final good: y = (w + rk)/P f . Using arguments analogous to Waugh (2010), income per-effective worker can be written as
Since the quantities are in efficiency units, we can restate this asỹ
where tildes on a variable represent quantities in per worker terms. Figure 4 illustrates the relative income per worker in the model and in the data. The model accounts 73 percent of the log variance in income observed in the data. In terms of the countries lining up correctly, the correlation for income per worker between the model and the data is 0.82.
In equation (2), human capital per worker h is taken directly from the data and λ m is a calibrated parameter. The remaining components in (2) are equilibrium objects. The product of two terms preceding the capital stock in equation (2),
like TFP in an income accounting sense. We will refer to the first term, Unlike a closed economy model, the capital stock depends on trade barriers as well as technology, since the trade in capital goods affects capital formation in each country. Differences in capital per worker account for 70 percent of log variance in income per worker in our model. The TFP components account for 3 percent. However, the equilibrium capital per worker is not orthogonal to TFP, so these figures are lower bounds for development accounting purposes. We do not have a counterpart in the data for capital stock in our model, since the capital stock in the model is a composite of the stocks of producer durables and structures.
However, the stocks of producer durables and structures are the result of investments and we can compare the aggregate investment rate in the model to that in the data. We discuss the model's implications for investment rates across countries in the next section.
Investment rates
As Hsieh and Klenow (2007) point out, investment rates in PPP are positively correlated with income per worker, while investment rates at domestic prices tend to be uncorrelated with income per worker. Our model delivers investment rates that are consistent with this evidence. 
In equilibrium, r i k i = w i α/(1−α) which allows further simplification to P ei x e i = ϕ e µw i α/(1− α) and P si x s i = ϕ s (1 − µ)w i α/(1 − α). Therefore, measured total investment, in efficiency units, is P ei x e i + P si x s i = [µϕ e + (1 − µ)ϕ s ]w i α/(1 − α). Now use the fact that in equilibrium r i k i = w i α/(1 − α), which implies that total income is w i + r i k i = w i /(1 − α). So the investment rate in domestic prices, which is defined to be total investment divided by total income, is simply α[µϕ e + (1 − µ)ϕ s ]. This is clearly constant across countries, a fact that is consistent with the data.
The investment rate measured in PPP prices for country i is given by
where P Ii is aggregate price index for investment, see appendix C. Figure 7 plots the investment rate across countries. The model captures the systematic variation: rich countries have higher investment rates than poor countries. However, the variation is somewhat overstated as the model tends to underpredict investment rates in poor countries. The correlation between the model and data for investment rates is 0.60. Figure 8 illustrates the cdf for the capital goods production in the model along with its empirical counterpart. The model captures the observed skewness in production. Furthermore, the correlation between model and data for capital goods production is 0.82, so the countries are in fact lining up correctly in Figure 8 .
Capital goods production
Counterfactuals
The purpose of the following counterfactual exercises is to understand the role of trade in economic development. We report percentage changes in income per worker across steady states for each counterfactual exercise. Equation (2) shows each component that directly affects income per worker.
Free trade in capital goods
In our first exercise, we compute the income gains from free trade in capital goods. In this counterfactual world, the productivity parameters and trade barriers for intermediate goods are set at their calibrated levels, and τ eij 's are set at unity for all the country pairings, (i, j). Theoretically, removal of capital goods trade barriers would increase trade in capital goods across all country combinations. Overall, countries import a larger range of capital goods and spend less on domestically produced capital goods. This results in smaller home trade shares in capital goods; see Figure 9 . With removal of distortions to capital goods trade, countries specialize according to their comparative advantage. World production of capital goods relocates more to rich countries and poor countries specialize more in intermediate goods. These production efficiency gains expand the size of the "world pie"; relative to the baseline, world GDP increases by almost 20 percent. In fact, with the removal of capital goods trade barriers, both poor and rich countries experience an increase in their incomes. However, the share of world GDP in the rich countries decreases: the 90-10 ratio in income per worker decreases from 14.40 to 9.27. Poor countries gain more than rich countries as illustrated in Figure 10 . For example, the countries that import most of their capital goods (mostly poor countries) gain roughly 110 percent. Rich countries gain as well, with an average gain of roughly 40 percent. Major producers of capital goods, such as the US, Japan, and Germany, gain little since they are the most efficient to begin with, and do not rely on capital goods imports.
In our model, income gains from trade come from two channels: capital formation and aggregate TFP. In standard Ricardian models of trade, gains from trade come through the TFP channel: countries specialize more in goods for which they have a comparative advantage, and hence, standards of living increase in response to trade liberalization. In our model, changes in capital formation also contribute to the gains from trade. Removing barriers to trade in capital goods allows countries to accumulate higher levels of capital stock. This is especially true for poor countries. Figure 11 shows the contribution of the factor component,k α i h 1−α i (see equation (2)). The horizontal axis is the percentage change in income and the vertical axis is the percentage change in the factors component of our development accounting equation. Countries with larger income gains also experience larger increases in factors. On average, 95 percent of the gain in our counterfactual exercise comes from increases in capital.
The TFP channel operates through the home trade share in intermediates. Removing trade barriers in capital goods implies that poor countries specialize more in production of intermediate goods and their home trade share in intermediate goods increases. This results in gains for poor countries, as can be seen from equation (2). The increase in the trade component of TFP accounts for about 10 percent of the overall income gain for poor countries.
Autarky in capital goods
In this experiment, we eliminate all trade in capital goods by setting τ eij to prohibitively high levels for all the country pairings. In the baseline case many poor countries are net exporters of intermediate goods and net importers of capital goods. Once capital goods trade is shut down, they can no longer import capital goods from the countries that are relatively better at producing capital goods. This distorts the world pattern of capital goods production toward countries that are inefficient at producing them, the poor countries. Thus, countries have to divert resources away from their sector of comparative advantage. These efficiency losses shrink the size of "world pie" by about 3.7 percent. Moreover, the cross-country differences in income per worker increase: the 90-10 ratio increases from 14.40 in the baseline to 15.45 in autarky, while the log variance in income per worker increases by 1.4 percent.
Inefficiencies resulting from misallocation of factors lead to income losses for all countries.
The cost of autarky is illustrated in Figure 12 . The average income loss for countries in the bottom decile of world income distribution is about 9 percent. However, the income loss is small for the major producers of capital goods (US, Japan, China, Germany, etc.).
The income loss due to autarky operates through capital accumulation and TFP. Figure  13 shows that almost all of the loss is accounted for by decreased capital for all countries.
Free trade in capital goods and intermediate goods
In this exercise we remove barriers to trade in both sectors by setting τ mij = τ eij = 1 for all countries. Income gains are about ten times larger compared to free trade in capital goods only. In addition, poor countries stand to gain more than twice as much as rich countries; see Figure 14 . There are two reasons why the gains more than double relative to free trade in capital goods alone. First, the average trade barrier in intermediate goods is larger than the average trade barrier in capital goods. Thus, when we switch to free trade, we are reducing the barriers in the intermediate goods sector by a larger amount than in the capital goods sector. Second, trade in intermediate goods accounts for a larger share of total trade than does trade in capital goods. In our baseline model intermediate goods trade flows are three times as large as capital goods trade flows. Production of capital goods relocates further to rich countries and production of intermediates relocates more to poor countries.
Relative to free trade in capital goods only, the TFP channel is quantitatively more important when trade barriers are removed in both sectors; there are no barriers to distort the allocation of productive resources either across countries or across sectors. Free trade in intermediates results in increased specialization in intermediates across countries implying smaller home trade shares in intermediates, which directly affects TFP. However, capital accumulation is also affected by free trade in intermediates. Poor countries run a trade surplus in intermediate goods in order to exchange for capital goods purchases, thereby making capital goods purchases less costly. On average, increased capital accumulation accounts for 80 percent of the income gains, see Figure 15 . 
Autarky in capital goods and intermediate goods
In this counterfactual exercise we set each country to complete autarky by setting trade barriers in both sectors restrictively high. Each country faces the task of producing all of its intermediate goods and capital goods. The size of the world pie shrinks by close to 10 percent. Figure 16 shows the income losses across countries. Income is affected through both the TFP channel and the capital accumulation channel.
The capital accumulation channel accounts for about 87 percent of the decline in income, on average. Autarky in the capital goods channel directly results in the inability of poor countries' ability to accumulate capital. In addition, shutting down trade in intermediates implies that poor countries can not specialize in intermediates and exchange them for capital goods as well, thus, further decreasing capital accumulation. Finally, autarky in intermediates implies that the home trade share in intermediate goods is one for all countries one which directly affects TFP.
Conclusion
In this paper, we embed a multi-country multi-sector Ricardian model of trade into a neoclassical growth framework. By calibrating the model to bilateral trade flows, our model successfully reproduces the cross-country patterns in income per worker, investment rates, Income loss (percent) and capital goods production.
Through counterfactual exercises, we show that the income gains from free trade in capital goods are large for the countries that are net importers of capital goods, i.e., poor countries. With free trade, poor countries are able to realize efficiency gains by reallocating resources towards the sector of their comparative advantage, i.e., the non-capital goods sector. At the other extreme, autarky in capital goods is costly for poor countries. Shutting down trade in capital goods forces poor countries to allocate productive resources away from the sector of their comparative advantage, thereby reducing their capital stock as well as TFP. 
A Derivations
In this section we show how to derive analytical expressions for price indices and trade shares.
The following derivations rely on three properties of the exponential distribution.
1) u ∼ exp(µ) and k > 0 ⇒ ku ∼ exp(µ/k).
2) u 1 ∼ exp(µ 1 ) and u 2 ∼ exp(µ 2 ) ⇒ min{u 1 , u 2 } ∼ exp(µ 1 + µ 2 ).
3) u 1 ∼ exp(µ 1 ) and u 2 ∼ exp(µ 2 ) ⇒ Pr(u 1 ≤ u 2 ) = µ 1 µ 1 +µ 2 .
A.1 Price indices
Here we derive the price index for intermediate goods, P mi . The price index for capital goods can be derived in a similar manner. Cost minimization by producers of tradable good u implies a unit cost of an input bundle used in sector m, which we denote by d mi .
Perfect competition implies that price in country i of the individual intermediate good u, when purchased from country j, equals unit cost in country j times the trade barrier
where B m is a collection of constant terms. The trade structure implies that country i purchases each intermediate good u from the least cost supplier, so the price of good u is
Since u j ∼ exp(λ mj ), it follows from property 1 that
Then, property 2 implies that
.
Lastly, appealing to property 1 again,
(3)
Apply a change of variables so that ω i = µ mi t and obtain
is the Gamma function. Therefore,
A.2 Trade shares
We now derive the trade shares π mij , the fraction of i's total spending on intermediate goods that was obtained from country j. Due to the law of large numbers, the fraction of goods that i obtains from j is also the probability, that for any intermediate good u, country j is the least cost supplier. Mathematically,
where we have used equation (3) along with properties 2 and 3. Trade shares in the capital goods sector are derived identically.
B Data
This section describes our data sources as well as how we map our model to the data. Prices Data on the prices of capital goods across countries are constructed by the ICP (available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPEXT/Resources/ICP 2011.html). We use the variable PX.WL, which is the PPP price of "Machinery & equipment", world price equals 1. The price of structures is also taken from the ICP; we use the variable PX.WL, which is the PPP price of "Construction", world price equals 1. The price of final goods in our model is taken to be the price consumption goods from PWT63 as the variable PC.
Human Capital
We use data on years of schooling from Barro and Lee (2010) to construct human capital measures. We take average years of schooling for the population age 25 and up and convert into measures of human capital using h = exp(ϕ(s)), where ϕ is piecewise linear in average years of schooling s. This method is identical to the one used by Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005) . 
National Accounts
Construction of Trade Shares
The empirical counterpart to the model variable π mij is constructed following Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) (recall that this is the fraction of country i's spending on intermediates that was produced in country j). We divide the value of country i's imports of intermediates from country j, by i's gross production of intermediates minus i's total exports of intermediates (for the whole world) plus i's total imports of intermediates (for only the sample) to arrive at the bilateral trade share. Trade shares for the capital goods sector are obtained similarly.
C Aggregate price index for investment
We will define an index for a composite investment good, x k , and a corresponding price index, P k , such that total investment expenditures is P k x k = P e x e + P s x s . We already have a notion of a composite capital stock that is a Cobb-Douglas composite of producer durables and structures: k = (k e ) µ (k s ) 1−µ . In addition, the rental rate for the composite capital stock is given by
Recall that the price of each of capital good is related to its rental rate through a no arbitrage condition:
We would like the same relationship to hold for the price of the aggregate investment good. Finally, in steady state, investments in each type of capital are such that the stocks of each type of capital is constant over time:
. We would like this to hold for the composite investment as well. This requires us to construct a depreciation rate for the composite investment good, call it δ k .
In sum, we have three equations to solve for three unknowns: P k , x k , and δ k .
Note that investment spending on each type of capital is
This can be further simplified to P e x e = µϕ e r k k and P s x s = (1 − µ)ϕ s r k k. Therefore, total investment spending from equation (4) is given by
Next, combine equations (5) and (6) to get
These last two expressions imply that ϕ
, which allows us to solve
. Then we use equations (5) and (6) to solve for the price and quantity indices. 
D Tables
E Robustness
The parameter θ plays a key role especially in measuring the gains from trade. Its inverse is often referred to as the elasticity of trade as in Simonovska and Waugh (2010) . Since all other calibrated parameters depend on the value we assume for θ, it is important that our main results are robust to other values of θ as well. Previous estimates from Eaton and Kortum (2002) suggest that the value is some where between 0.12 and 0.18. using their methodology we estimate a value of 0.15. We therefore reproduce all of our results using θ = 0.15. We begin by noting that the calibrated trade costs are substantially smaller under the lower value of θ. However, the distribution of trade barriers looks similar: poor countries face larger costs to export, while average costs to import look almost the same across countries. Moreover, the productivity parameters are essentially unchanged, see Table 3 . The implications for how the model's predictions line up with the data are essentially unchanged.
For example, with θ = 0.23 the model explains 73 percent of income per worker, while with θ = 0.15 the model explain 71 percent. However, there are huge differences in the counterfactual implications in terms of income gains. With θ = 0.23, the implied income gains are magnified by a factor of between 1.5 and 2, relative to the case with θ = 0.15. The main point still goes through. Cross-country differences in income per worker are due to both capital formation and TFP, both of which crucially depend on trade. 
